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Abstract 
Six experiments examined the effects of person factors (i.e., social value orientation 
and consistency) and situation factors  (i.e.,  stereotype primes) on cooperative behavior in 
various experimental games.  Results indicated that the main and joint influences of person 
and  situation  factors  on  cooperative  choices  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  game  (i.e., 
prisoner's dilemma or dictator game).  Social  value orientation,  consistency,  and primes 
affect  cooperative  behavior  only  in  a  dictator  game,  while  these  factors  also  lead  to 
rumination about partner's behavioral intentions and personality (and therefore to different 
cooperative choices) in a prisoner's dilemma game.  Differences between these games were 
explained in terms of the impact they have on other- and self-focus. 
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The doctrine of rational self interest predicts that cooperative outcomes should be 
very small in interpersonal and group interaction.  Nonetheless, it is often observed, both in 
real-life and in experimental games, that people tend to give to their partners, to beggars, to 
public goods, to good causes, and they often contribute considerable sums.  This 
observation has caused researchers to re-examine models of cooperative behavior by 
incorporating the assumption that people do not always behave according their self-interest. 
Cooperative behavior has often been investigated in the context of interdependent 
dilemmas such as prisoner's dilemma games or social dilemmas.  These situations are 
interdependent because outcomes of involved people are dependent on each other, and they 
consist of dilemmas because they involve conflicting motives between pursuing immediate 
self-interest or collective interest.  A large stream of work has demonstrated that 
cooperative behavior in these games is influenced by interpersonal dispositions such as 
social value orientation (SVO) (McClintock, 1972).  A limited amount of research has 
demonstrated that cooperative behavior may also vary with subtle situational influences 
such as primes (e.g., Herr, 1986; Hertel & Fiedler, 1994, 1998; Hertel &  Kerr, 2001; 
Neuberg, 1988; Smeesters, Warlop, Van Averrnaet, Comeille, & Yzerbyt, in press). 
Recent studies demonstrated that consistency of SVO may also playa role by 
moderating the influence of SVO and primes on cooperative behavior (Hertel & Fiedler, 
1998; Smeesters et al., in press).  However, research conducted on this factor has led to 
diverging conclusions.  Hertel & Fiedler's (1998) research suggested that primes should 
have strong effects on cooperative choices, but only for individuals with a low consistent About Prisoners and Dictators  - 4 
orientation.  Smeesters et al. (in press) however found that primes may also have strong 
effects on beliefs about the partner for individuals low and high consistent in SVO. 
n our view, however, these studies may have relied on different contexts: the study of 
Smeesters et al. (in press) may have been characterized by a higher level of 
interdependence than the study by Hertel & Fiedler (1998).  This stronger interdependent 
context may have urged individuals to focus more on beliefs about their partner (such as 
expectations of partner's cooperation or impressions about the partner) in the study of 
Smeesters et al. (in press) compared to what took place in Hertel & Fiedler's (1998) 
experimental setting. 
This observation led us to the following question: does an interdependence context 
lead to a higher attention to partner beliefs (other-focus) and different influences of SVO, 
consistency, and primes on cooperative behavior than a context in which this 
interdependence character is attenuated or even non-existing.  Six experiments were 
conducted to examine this issue.  We selected two types of experimental games differing in 
the degree of interdependence: a game characterized by mutual dependence or 
interdependence (a prisoner's dilemma game) and a game characterized by unilateral 
dependence (a dictator game). 
Influences of Social Value Orientations and Primes on Cooperative Behavior 
Research demonstrates that cooperative behavior may vary with a variety of 
dispositional and situational variables.  The dispositional variable that has received most 
attention in the literature on cooperative behavior is SVO (McClintock, 1972), defined as a 
particular preference for specific patterns of outcomes for self and others.  There is About Prisoners and Dictators  - 5 
evidence that at least three orientations can be distinguished (Messick & McClintock, 1968; 
Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Van Lange, 1999; see Van Lange, 2000 for an overview): a 
pro-social orientation (i.e., the tendency to maximize joint outcomes and to maximize 
equality in outcomes), an individualistic orientation (i.e., the tendency to maximize own 
outcomes with little or no consideration about the other's outcomes), and a competitive 
orientation (i.e., the tendency to maximize the own outcomes relative to the other's 
outcomes).  The latter two orientations are often combined into a group of pro-self 
orientations because they both are primarily concerned with their own outcomes, either in 
an absolute or a relative manner (see e.g., Van Lange & Liebrand, 1989, 1991a, 1991b; 
Van Vugt, Meertens, & Van Lange). 
Compared to pro-selfs, pro-socials are more likely to exercise personal restraint and 
to make cooperative choices in various kinds of situations such as a prisoner's dilemma 
game (PDG), social dilemmas, negotiations, environmental dilemmas, close relationship, or 
helping occasions (e.g., De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 
1986; Liebrand & Van Run, 1985; McClintock & Allison, 1989; McClintock & Liebrand, 
1988; Van Lange, Agnew, Harinck, & Steemers, 1997a; Van Vugt et aI.,  1995).  It has also 
been demonstrated that pro-socials and pro-selfs make different judgments of others. 
These differences may be interpreted in terms of chronically accessible constructs 
(Higgins, 1996a; Higgins &  King, 1981).  Previous research on perceptual differences 
between pro-socials and pro-selfs suggests that morality is a chronically accessible 
construct for pro-socials and that might is a chronically accessible construct for pro-selfs 
(De Bruin & Van Lange, 2000; Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, &  Suhre, 1986; Sattler & Kerr). 
Pro-socials tend to interpret situations in terms of morality, pro-selfs in terms of might. About Prisoners and Dictators  - 6 
Many studies also showed that cooperative behavior may vary with situational cues 
such as personality impressions ofthe interaction partner (e.g., De Bruin & Van Lange, 
1999a, 1999b; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), specific-features associated with close 
relationships (e.g., Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus,  1991; Van Lange, 
Rusbult, Drigotas, Arriaga, Witcher, & Cox, 1997b), and social norms (e.g., the need norm, 
Deutsch, 1975).  Van Lange (2000) however argued that situational influences on 
cooperative behavior can also take the form of priming influences.  In the automaticity 
literature, it is argued that the activation of mentally represented constructs such as traits or 
stereotypes in one context results in behavior consistent with these constructs in a 
subsequent unrelated context (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis & Van 
Knippenberg, 1998).  In the context of  cooperative decision-making, Hertel & Fiedler 
(1994) showed that the prior activation of morality-related traits elicits more cooperative 
behavior than the prior activation of might-related traits.  Further, Hertel & Kerr (2001) 
demonstrated that priming loyalty increased in group-favoritism. 
Van Lange (2000) argued that cooperative behavior in interdependence dilemmas 
may be a function of both SVO and primes.  In his opinion, one should distinguish weak 
and strong situations (Snyder & Ickes, 1985), when examining these influences on 
cooperative behavior.  Weak situations (e.g., a neutral priming condition) lack relevant 
cues to guide cooperative behavior and are relatively ambiguous.  In such situations, the 
influence of SVO on cooperative behavior should be large.  Strong situations are 
characterized by relevant cues/primes that guide cooperative behavior and tend to be 
unambiguous.  In such situations, priming influences should be large.  Thus, comparing About Prisoners and Dictators  - 7 
weak with strong situations, one should obtain an interaction between SVO and primes 
(Van Lange, 2000; Van Lange et aI.,  1997a). 
Consistency of Social Value Orientation 
Recent research (Hertel & Fiedler, 1998; Smeesters, Warlop, & Van Avermaet, 2002; 
Smeesters et aI., in press) demonstrated that consistency should also be incorporated in 
research on the effects of SVO and primes on cooperative behavior.  Hertel & Fiedler 
(1998) were the first to notice the importance of this variable.  This variable refers to the 
consistency in the choice pattern with which SVO is measured in the Ring Measure of 
Social Values! (Liebrand, 1984; Liebrand & McClintock, 1988).  Hertel &  Fiedler (1998) 
interpreted consistency in terms of a clear-cut decision strategy or orientation.  Whereas 
high consistent (HCon) individuals have a stronger clear-cut decision preference or 
orientation, low consistent (LCon) individuals do not (yet) have a clearly developed 
orientation.  Conceptually, consistency refers to the dispositional strength of a SVO, with 
HCon orientations reflecting stronger dispositions and being more stable over time than 
LCon orientations (Hertel & Fiedler, 1998; Smeesters et al., 2002). 
Hertel & Fiedler (1998) studied the influences of morality-related primes versus 
might-related primes on allocation choices in the Ring Measure of Social Values. 
Consistency, although measured after the priming procedure, was considered as a pre-
experimental independent variable (because it was strongly correlated with a pre-test 
measure of consistency).  Participants were told that they had to make 24 pairwise 
decisions about the amount of money to be allocated to themselves and to another person. 
Participants were also told that actual pairing with a partner would be done by chance at the About Prisoners and Dictators  - 8 
end of the Ring Measure.  The experiment was explicitly designed to minimize rumination 
about character and strategy of the partner in the game2•  As a result, allocation decisions 
afforded a pure measure of SVO rather than an orientation toward the partner.  The results 
showed that morality-related primes increased cooperative allocations whereas might-
related primes decreased cooperative allocations, but only for LCon individuals.  Hertel & 
Fiedler (1998) argued that a HCon (but not a LCon) individual's SVO is strong enough to 
resist priming influences.  This result suggests that consistency should moderate the SVO x 
primes interaction on cooperative behavior.  Specifically, this interaction should then only 
appear for LCon individuals.  In stark contrast, cooperative behavior of HCon individuals 
should only be influenced by their SVO and not by primes. 
Smeesters et al. (in press) tested this hypothesis in a real interdependent situation. 
This was done by assessing SVO and consistency prior to a priming manipulation and 
measuring the influence of  these variables on cooperative behavior in a 2-person PDG. 
They obtained, however, no support for this hypothesis but instead found that SVO and 
primes had strong effects on expectations of partner' scooperation for both HCon and LCon 
individuals.  SVO only had an influence on these expectations in the neutral priming 
condition: pro-socials expected more cooperation of their partner than pro-selfs.  In the 
morality and might priming conditions, expectations of pro-socials and pro-selfs did not 
differ from each other.  Participants in the morality and might priming conditions expected 
respectively more and less cooperation than in the neutral priming condition. 
Subsequently, participants used these expectations to determine their own cooperative 
behavior.  HCon pro-socials showed behavioral assimilation: they played cooperatively 
against a cooperative other but turned to non-cooperative behavior when they expected the About Prisoners and Dictators  - 9 
other to be a non-cooperative person.  Heon pro-selfs showed non-cooperative behavior in 
all conditions, even when they believed their partner to be very cooperative, a reaction that 
Smeesters et al. (in press) typified as exploitation.  These results are congruent with models 
of SVO (Van Lange, 1999).  Leon pro-socials and Leon pro-selfs also showed behavioral 
assimilation.  Smeesters et al. (2002) argued that the way Leon individuals deal with these 
cooperative and non-cooperative expectations is rather determined by default norms 
associated with these expectations.  When playing against a cooperative person, reciprocal 
cooperative behavior is normative or desirable.  When playing against a non-cooperative 
person, the default norm is to protect oneself by behaving non-cooperatively as well. 
The strong interdependence character of Smeesters et aI.' s (in press) study might 
explain why their findings were not entirely in line with those reported by Hertel & Fiedler 
(1998).  In the Smeesters et al. study, participants were told that they were linked with a 
partner and both were simultaneously going to make a choice affecting each other's 
outcomes before they made a choice in the PDG.  It has often been found and argued that 
partner beliefs (such as expectations of partner's cooperation and impressions about the 
partner) are important antecedents of cooperative decision-making in interdependence 
situations (e.g., De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999a, 1999a; Kelley &  Stahelski, 1970; Kelley & 
Thibaut, 1978; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994).  In such situations, individuals may be 
strongly focused on the characteristics and behavioral intentions of the partner (called 
other-focus) and may strongly engage in rumination about these beliefs.  In the Hertel & 
Fiedler study, participants were told that they would be linked with a partner only after 
making all their choices.  Such a manipulation was intended to dramatically decrease the 
level of other-focus and minimize rumination about partner beliefs.  In other words, the About Prisoners and Dictators  - 10 
interdependence character of the Hertel & Fiedler study is likely to have been strongly 
attenuated.  This analysis suggests that social interactions that differ in terms of 
interdependence may lead to different effects of dispositional and situational influences on 
cooperative behavior.  The focus of our paper is to test in which way the presence or 
absence of an interdependence situation determines the degree of other-focus and the 
influence of SVO, consistency, and primes on cooperative behavior. 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game versus Dictator Game 
The above reasoning suggests that the predictions of Hertel & Fiedler (1998) should 
be obtained whenever the interdependence character is absent from the context.  In such a 
setting, other-focus and rumination about partner beliefs should not be predominant.  A 
game that may reflect these characteristics is a dictator game (DG).  This game reflects a 
unilateral dependence context (see for example Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Hoffman, 
McCabe, & Smith, 1996).  In a DG, the partner (i.e., the recipient) has no decision power: 
this person has no money to allocate and has no power in terms of either accepting or 
rejecting the actor's (i.e., the dictator) offer.  Consequently, there are no strategic factors to 
constrain the dictator's intentions.  That is, individuals may afford not to be interested in 
the characteristics and functioning of the partner.  Individuals in a DG also do not 
spontaneously engage in impression formation (Roth, 1995).  As a matter of fact, it is 
assumed that cooperative behavior in a DG is rather directly influenced by social motives 
or norms (Bolton, Katok, & Zwick, 1998; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Forsythe, Horowitz, 
Savin, & Sefton, 1994; 10hannesson & Persson, 2000).  Some people may be kind and 
show compassion with the other person, whereas others are only driven by self-interest. About Prisoners and Dictators  - 11 
As already argued, a prisoner's dilemma game has a strong interdependence character 
and partner beliefs are important antecedents of cooperative decision-making.  In such a 
situation, other-focus might reach a higher level and rumination about the partner may be a 
more predominant cognitive activity compared to a DG.  As in Smeesters et al. (in press), 
factors such as SVO and primes should have strong influences on these partner beliefs, 
which may then be inputs for subsequent cooperative decision-making. 
Overview of the Studies 
This paper has two goals: we wanted to compare (a) differences in other-focus 
between a PDG and a DG, and (b) the influences of SVO, consistency, and stereotype 
primes on cooperative behavior in a PDG versus a DG.  In contrast to the studies conducted 
by Hertel & Fiedler (1998) and Smeesters et al.  (in press), we decided to examine the 
effects of stereotype primes instead of trait primes.  We examined the effects of a religious 
versus business stereotype, which are strongly associated with respectively cooperativeness 
and selfishness (De Dreu, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1995).  Stereotypes are beliefs that certain 
traits or acts are characteristic of a particular group of individuals (Brewer, 1988; Fiske, 
1998; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).  Activation of a stereotype leads to the automatic activation 
of traits or attributes associated with this social category (Bargh, 1994; Brewer, 1988; 
Devine, 1989), which may then influences one's perceptions and judgments about others 
and one's social behavior.  Typically, perceptions and behavior shift in stereotype 
consistent ways (see e.g., Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 
1977; Devine, 1989; for research and Brewer, 1988; Bargh, 1994; Higgins, 1996a, for 
reviews on automatic social perception; see e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; About Prisoners and Dictators  - 12 
Dijksterhuis, Aarts, Bargh, & Van Knippenberg, 2000; Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 
1998,2000, for research and Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; 
Wheeler &  Petty, 2001, for reviews on automatic social behavior). 
In Experiment 1, we focused on the effects of SVO, consistency, and primes on 
cooperative behavior in a PDG as in Smeesters et al. (in press).  We tried to replicate and 
extend this research by demonstrating that the formation of an impression, which remained 
unmeasured in this study, is also an important factor when playing a PDG.  In Experiment 
.2, we compared differences in other-focus between a PDG and a DG.  In Experiment 3, the 
effects of SVO, consistency, and stereotype primes were examined on cooperative behavior 
in the context of a DG.  Subsequently, we tried to design a paradigm in which we could 
imitate the contexts of both the PDG and the DG in one experiment.  In Experiment 4, we 
examined the effects of this paradigm on other-focus.  In Experiment 5, we used this 
paradigm to study the effects of SVO and stereotype primes on cooperative behavior for 
Heon individuals only.  Finally, in Experiment 6 we examined how to make Leon 
individuals behave as Heon individuals in a DG. 
Experiment 1 
This experiment is of an extension of Smeesters et al.'s (in press) experiments.  The 
primes affected expectations of partner's cooperation in their study, but impressions about 
the partner were not measured.  Information about partner impressions may however 
provide additional insights regarding the role of partner beliefs in cooperative decision-
making.  It is often argued that expectations of cooperative behavior are related to morality 
and might impressions of the partner (e.g., Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange & About Prisoners and Dictators  - 13 
Liebrand, 1989).  The results of Smeesters et al. (in press) did not inform us as to how 
expectations were related to these impressions.  Therefore, we selected items that could 
form a moral impression scale and items that could form a might impression scale. 
In line with Smeesters et aI.  (in press), we expected religious primes to elicit more 
cooperative behavior than neutral or business primes among all participants but HCon pro-
selfs (Hypothesis 1).  Further, we hypothesized a main effect of priming on expectations of 
partner's cooperation: religious and business primes should elicit respectively higher and 
lower expectations of cooperation from the partner than neutral primes (Hypothesis 2). We 
also predicted a main effect of SVO on expectations of partner's cooperation: pro-socials 
should expect more cooperation from their partners than pro-selfs.  Consistent with 
Smeesters et al. (in press), we however expected the impact of SVO to be smaller in the 
religious and business priming conditions than in the neutral priming condition (Hypothesis 
1). We also predicted the correlation between expectations and cooperative behavior to be 
positive in all conditions except for HCon pro-selfs in the religious priming condition 
where it should be negative (Hypothesis 4).  The latter prediction is derived from the fact 
that HCon pro-selfs tend to exploit others believed to be very cooperative (Smeesters et aI., 
in press). 
Similar to the predictions about expectations of partner's cooperation, we expected 
SVO and primes to have an impact on impressions about the partner.  Because we assume 
that religiousness is associated with morality and business with might (see also De Dreu et 
aI.,  1995), we expected stereotype primes to have a strong effect on the impression measure 
with which they are associated.  Social value orientations should only have an effect in the 
neutral priming condition: the impression judgments should be dominated by a About Prisoners and Dictators  - 14 
participant's chronic construct (morality for pro-socials and might for pro-selfs).  Further, 
we expected expectations of partner's cooperation and cooperative behavior to be only 
correlated with the impression measures in the priming condition with which these 
impressions are associated (i.e., with the moral impression in the religious priming 
condition and with the might impression in the business priming condition).  In the neutral 
priming condition, correlations of expectations of partner's cooperation and cooperative 
behavior with the impression measures should be only significant for the impression 
measures that reflect a chronic construct for participants. 
More specifically, with respect to the moral impression of the partner, we expected 
religious primes to elicit more moral judgments than neutral or business primes.  Similar to 
the prediction of expectations of partner's cooperation, we predicted SVO to only influence 
this judgment in the neutral priming condition: pro-socials should judge their partner as 
being more moral than pro-selfs do (Hypothesis 5).  Further, we expected correlations 
between the moral impression of the partner and expectations of partner's cooperation to be 
positive for all participants in the religious priming condition and for HCon and LCon pro-
socials in the neutral priming condition.  We had the same prediction for the correlations 
between the moral impression of the partner and cooperative behavior except for HCon 
pro-selfs in the religious priming condition, where we expected a negative correlation 
(Hypothesis 6).  With respect to the might impression of the partner, we expected business 
primes to elicit more might impressions than neutral or religious primes.  We also predicted 
pro-selfs to judge their partner as being mightier than pro-socials do, but in the neutral 
priming condition only (Hypothesis 7).  We expected correlations between the might 
impression of the partner and expectations of partner's cooperation and between the might About Prisoners and Dictators  - 15 
impression of the partner and cooperative behavior to be negative for all participants in the 
business priming condition and for HCon and LCon pro-selfs in the neutral priming 
condition (Hypothesis 8) 
Method 
Participants and design.  One hundred forty-eight undergraduates participated in 
partial fulfillment of course requirements.  All were native Dutch speakers. The 
experimental design included three between-participants factors: SVO (pro-social versus 
pro-self), consistency (high versus low), stereotype primes (religious versus neutral versus 
business).  Dependent variables were participants' own cooperative behavior in a PDG, 
expectations of partner's cooperation and moral and might impressions of the partner. 
Procedure and materials.  Participants were invited to the lab in groups of ten persons. 
After they entered the laboratory, they were told that they would participate in a sequence 
of unrelated tasks and were then brought to individual cubicles.  They were requested to 
perform a sequence of tasks: (a) Ring Measure of Social Values (Liebrand, 1984), (b) a 
filler task, (c) a subliminal priming procedure, (d) a PDG and expectations of partner's 
cooperation, (e) impression ratings of the partner, and (f) a post-experimental 
questionnaire. 
Measuring Social Value Orientation and consistency.  Participants started the 
experiment by performing the Ring Measure of Social Values (Liebrand, 1984).  This 
computerized task can be used to measure each participant's SVO and its consistency.  The 
Ring Measure confronts participants with 24 choice trials.  Each trial exists of two different 
distributions of amounts of money for the self and for another imaginary person, which can About Prisoners and Dictators  - 16 
be either positive or negative.  The 24 pairs of outcomes are sampled from a circle in an 
own/other outcome plane containing outcomes to the self on the horizontal axis and 
outcomes to the other on a vertical axis.  The center of the circle coincides with the origin 
of the outcome plane, i.e., BEF 0 for the self and BEF 0 for the other person3.  The radius 
of the circle is BEF 1500.  Each pair consists of two equidistant own/other outcome 
distributions that were located next to each other on the circle.  An example of a pair is the 
choice between Alternative A:  BEF 750 for the self and BEF -1300. for the other and 
Alternative B: BEF 390 for the self and BEF -1450. for the other.  In each of the 24 pairs, 
participants were instructed to choose that alternative of the pair they most preferred. 
Adding up the chosen amounts separately for the self and for the other provides two 
totals that can be represented as a single point on the horizontal and vertical axis, and 
provide an estimate of the direction of the participant's SVO vector in the outcome plane. 
Each orientation reflects a unique pattern of choices.  Participants were classified on the 
Ring Measure as making choices consistent with one of the orientations.  Participants with 
orientation vectors falling between 22.5° and 112.5° were classified as pro-socials and 
participants with orientation vectors falling between 292.5° (or -67.5°) and 22.5° were 
classified as pro-selfs.  Of the 148 participants, 71  could be identified as pro-socials and 75 
could be identified as pro-selfs.  Two participants could not be identified because they had 
an orientation vector of exactly 22.5°.  Further, we used the Ring Measure to determine the 
consistency of each participant's orientation.  The average level of consistency in our study 
was 85.4%.  We conducted a median split within the group of pro-socials and pro-selfs. 
Out of these two groups, 68 participants could be labeled as Heon individuals and 72 could 
be labeled as Leon individuals.  Six additional participants were discarded from the About Prisoners and Dictators  - 17 
analysis because they exhibited a consistency score that was less than 60%.  A total of 140 
participants remained for the analysis.  Thirty-four participants were classified as HCon 
pro-socials, 36 participants as LCon pro-socials, 34 participants as HCon pro-selfs, and 36 
participants as LCon pro-selfs.  After the Ring Measure, all participants took part in a filler-
experiment that lasted for 15 minutes. Participants had to perform several calculation tasks 
and solve word puzzles. 
Priming manipulation.  After participants finished the filler task, they were presented 
with a word-recognition task.  Participants sat in front of a computer screen.  They were 
told they would be presented with 30 letter strings appearing one by one on the screen. 
Half of these letter strings were existing words, the other half were non-existing words. 
Each trial.started with the presentation of a fixation point on the computer screen. 
Participants had to press the key '2' to start a trial.  They had to decide as quickly as 
possible whether or not a string was an existing word by pressing a key on the keyboard 
(' l' for an existing word,  '3' for a non-existing word). 
These 30 words were preceded by subliminal primes.  The words used as primes were 
retained from a pre-test in which students had to indicate which words were most 
characteristic for a religious or business stereotype.  In the religious stereotype priming 
condition, each letter string was preceded by a word related to religious people (priest, 
prayer, psalm, incense, father, missionary, religious, monk, brother, forgiveness, reverend, 
evangel, host, Christian, holy).  In the business stereotype priming condition, these words 
were replaced by words related to business people (manager, salesman, firm, stocks, 
director, executive, businessman, trader, turnover, business, dynamic, company-car, career, 
commercial, entemrising).  In the neutral priming condition, words that preceded each About Prisoners and Dictators  - 18 
letter string were unrelated to both the religious and business stereotype (e.g., light, curved, 
green).  Prime words were presented for 17 ms and masked by a row of X'  s 
("XXXXXXXXXXXX").  The mask remained on the screen for 225 ms and was 
immediately followed by the target word.  In all conditions, 15 different prime words were 
used and all these words were used twice.  Participants were randomly assigned to any of 
the three priming conditions. 
Measuring cooperative behavior in a prisoner's dilemma game and expectations of 
partner's cooperation.  Next, participants were asked to participate in an ostensibly 
unrelated decision task.  The PD~  was adopted from prior research (e.g., Van Lange, 1999, 
Study 3; Van Lange &  Kuhlman, 1994).  Each participant was told that s/he was paired 
with another participant in the laboratory.  Each participant was given four chips and told 
that the partner also received four chips.  They had to imagine that each chip had a value of 
BEF 10 to themselves and a value of BEF 20 to the partner.  Participants had to decide how 
many chips (none, one, two, three, or four) they would give to the partner.  They were told 
that the partner also had to decide how many chips s/he would give to the participant.  Each 
chip the participant would receive from the partner would also be worth BEF 20.  Maximal 
cooperation was to give four chips and maximal non-cooperation was to give zero chips4. 
Participants did not receive any information about the partner.  To measure expectations of 
partner's cooperation, we asked each participant the following question: "How many chips 
do you expect the other will give to you?"  One half of the participants received this 
question before making their own decision.  For the other half, the order was reversed5.  All 
participants understood the task structure. About Prisoners and Dictators  - 19 
Impressions of the partner. Following the behavioral choice, participants were asked 
to fill out a questionnaire that contained items to measure an impression of the partner. 
Participants were asked to rate the partner on a series of 8 items, anchored by 'not at all' 
and 'extremely' on a 5-point scale.  These items were four 'morality' items: 'honest', 'fair', 
'sincere', and 'equitable'.  There were also four 'might' items:  'dominant', 'self-assured', 
'determined', and 'intelligent'.  The eight items in the impression questionnaire were 
randomly ordered. 
Post-experimental questionnaire.  Finally, participants were asked to complete a 
funneled debriefing form that probed for awareness of the priming manipulation and 
suspicion about any relatedness among tasks (see funneled debriefing procedure, Bargh & 
Chartrand,.2000; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996).  None of the participants could retrieve any of 
the primes. or indicated any suspicion.  Finally, students were thanked for their participation 
and debriefed. 
Results 
Cooperative behavior.  A 2 (SVO: pro-social vs. pro-self) x 2 (consistency: high vs. 
low) x 3 (stereotype primes: religious vs. neutral. vs. business) between-participants 
ANOV  A was conducted on the number of chips that participants gave to the partner in the 
PDG.  We found three significant main effects.  First of all, we obtained a main effect of 
SVO, .EO, 128) =  34.77, p < .0001, which indicated that pro-socials CM = 1.89, SD =  1.31) 
cooperated more than pro-selfs CM = 1.06, SD = 1.11).  Second, we obtained a main effect 
of consistency, .EO, 128) =  4.23, p < .05, showing that LCon participants (M =  1.62, SD = 
1.29) cooperated more than BCon participants CM = 1.33, SD = 1.30).  Third, we obtained About Prisoners and Dictators  - 20 
a main effect of stereotype primes, .Ee2,  128) =  62.64, 2 < .0001.  Religious primes (M = 
2.35, SD = 1.37) elicited significantly more cooperative behavior than neutral primes (M = 
1.65, SD = 1.00), and business primes (M =  0.44, SD =  0.62) elicited significantly less 
cooperative behavior than neutral primes. 
All these main effects were qualified by a significant three-way interaction between 
SVO, consistency and stereotype primes, .E(2,  128) =  9.11, 2 < .001.  The means of this 
interaction are presented in Figure 1.  Following Smeesters et al.  (in press, Experiments 2-
4), we tested Hypothesis 1 by analyzing the three-way interaction by breaking down the 
sum of squares associated with the priming effect into two orthogonal a 2riori Helmert 
contrasts. The first contrast (Cl) compared the religious priming condition to the neutral 
and business priming conditions. The second contrast (C2) compared the neutral priming 
condition to the business priming condition. We then examined whether C1  and C2 varied 
as a function of the interaction between SVO and consistency. We expected C1  to be 
moderated by this interaction, but not C2. 
C1  came out significant, .E(l, 128) =  76.34,2 < .0001.  Participants in the religious 
priming condition (M = 2.35, SD = 1.37) behaved more cooperatively than participants in 
the neutrallbusiness priming conditions (M = 1.06, SD = 1.03).  In line with  Hypothesis 1, 
C1  varied as a function of the interaction between SVO and consistency, .E(l, 128) = 18.21, 
2 < .0001.  For HCon pro-socials, LCon pro-socials, and LCon pro-selfs, cooperative 
behavior was higher in the religious priming condition (M =  2.94, SD =  0.98) than in the 
neutrallbusiness priming conditions (M = l.l5, SD =  1.07) !(l04) =  8.24, 2 < .0001. 
Cooperative behavior among the HCon pro-selfs did not differ significantly between the 
religious priming condition (M =  0.58, SD =  0.51) and neutrallbusiness priming conditions About Prisoners and Dictators  - 21 
CM =  0.73, SD =  0.83), 1(32) =  -0.54, ns.  The C2 contrast was also significant, .E(1, 128) = 
49.99,12< .0001. Participants in the business priming condition eM. =  0.44, SD =  0.62) 
behaved less cooperatively than participants in the neutral priming condition eM = 1.65, SD 
= 1.00).  As expected, C2 was not moderated by the interaction between SVO and 
consistency, .E(1, 128) < 1, ns. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
EX12ectations of 12artners' coo12eration.  A 2 (SVO: pro-social vs. pro-self) x 2 
(consistency: high vs. low) x 3 (stereotype primes: religious vs. neutral vs. business) 
between-participants ANOV  A was conducted on expectations of partners' cooperation. 
This analysis revealed two significant main effects.  A main effect of SVO, .E(1,  128) = 
4.17, 12 < .001, indicated that pro-socials eM =  2.00, SD = 1.27) expected more cooperation 
of their partner than pro-selfs eM =  1.71, SD = 1.33).  In line with Hypothesis 2, there was 
also a main effect of stereotype primes, .Ee2,  128) = 105.31,12 < .0001.  Religious primes 
CM =  3.13, SD =  0.81) elicited higher expectations of partners' cooperation than neutral 
primes (M =  1.78, SD =  1.06) and business primes (M =  0.66, SD =  0.57) elicited lower 
expectations of partners' cooperation than neutral primes. 
These two main effects were qualified by an interaction between SVO and stereotype 
primes, .E(2,  128) =  3.81, 12 < .05.  The means are represented in Figure 2.  Planned 
comparisons clarified this two-way interaction by showing that pro-socials had higher 
expectations of their partners' cooperation than pro-selfs in the neutral priming condition 
CM =  2.16, SD =  1.05 vs. M =  1.39, SD =  0.92), .E(1, 128) =  10.63,12 < .01, but not in the About Prisoners and Dictators  - 22 
religious priming condition eM = 3.05, SD = 0.91 vs. M = 3.20, SD = 0.69), E(1,  128) < 1, 
ns, or the business priming condition eM = 0.77, SD = 0.61 vs. M = 0.54, SD = 0.51), E(1, 
128) < 1, ns.  The difference between pro-socials and pro-selfs was significantly larger in 
the neutral priming condition than in the religious priming condition, 1(92) = 3.35, 2 < .001, 
and the business priming condition, 1(92) = 3.20, 2 < .01.  There was no difference between 
the religious and the business priming condition, 1(90) < 1, ns.  These results supported 
Hypothesis 3. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
orrelations between expectations of partners' cooperation and own cooperative 
behavior. Correlations between expectations and behavior were all statistically significant. 
There was a negative expectation-behavior correlation for HCon pro-selfs in the religious 
priming condition, I =  -.65, 2 < .01.  All the other expectation-behavior correlations were 
positive and ranged between .58 and .95.  Hypothesis 4 was supported. 
Im2ressions of the partner.  We first performed a principal component analysis (PCA) 
to see whether the 8 impression items could be reduced to two meaningful groups of items: 
a moral group and a might group.  This PCA revealed two components with an eigenvalue 
greater than one. The first component had an eigenvalue of 2.50 and accounted for 31.32% 
of the  total  variance.  After Varimax  rotation  4  items  (honest,  fair,  sincere,  equitable) 
loaded highly on this component.  These four  items referred to  a moral impression scale 
(Cronbach's ex = 0.76). The second component had an eigenvalue of 2.12 and accounted for 
26.55%  of the total variance. Four items (dominant, self-assured, determined, intelligent) About Prisoners and Dictators  - 23 
loaded  highly  on  this  component.  These  items  referred  to  a  might  impression  scale 
(Cronbach's a = .73). 
Moral impression of the partner. We conducted separate 2 (SVO: pro-social vs. pro-
self) x 2 (consistency: high vs. low) x 3 (stereotype primes: religious vs. neutral vs. 
business) between-participants ANOV  As on the moral and the might impression of the 
partner.  The ANOV  A on the moral impression of the partner revealed only a main effect 
of stereotype primes, E(2, 128) =  24.87, 12 < .0001.  Religious primes eM =  3.80, SD = 
0.48) elicited higher moral ratings than neutral primes eM =  3.19, SD =  0.58), E(l, 128) = 
29.62, p < .0001, and business primes eM =  3.06, SD =  0.53), EO,  128) =  43.86, P < .0001. 
There was no difference between neutral primes and business primes, EO, 128) =  1.51, ns. 
We also calculated a planned comparison between pro-socials and pro-selfs at the neutral 
priming level.  This indicated that pro-socials eM =  3.36, SD =  0.62) judged their partner as 
being more moral than pro-selfs eM =  3.05, SD = 0.50), EO, 128) = 4.76, P. < .05, whereas 
this difference was not significant at the religious and business priming levels ~  < 1). 
These results confirmed Hypothesis 5.  To examine Hypothesis 6, we calculated a series of 
additional correlations. 
Correlations between moral impression of the partner and expectations of partner's 
cooperation. Correlations were significant at the religious priming level for all participants 
and at the neutral priming level for HCon and LCon pro-socials.  Significant correlations 
were all positive and ranged between .60 and .78. 
Correlations between moral impression of the partner and cooperative behavior. 
Correlations were also significant at the religious priming level for all participants 
and at the neutral priming level for HCon and LCon pro-socials.  The correlation between About Prisoners and Dictators  - 24 
cooperative behavior and moral impression of the partner was negative for HCon pro-selfs 
in the religious priming condition, r = -.60, II < .05.  All other significant correlations were 
positive and ranged between .60 and .66. 
Might impression of the partner.  The ANOV  A on the might impression of the partner 
revealed a main effect of stereotype primes, E(2, 128) =  11.83, p < .0001.  Business primes 
(M =  3.73, SD =  0.53) elicited higher might ratings of the partner than religious primes (M 
=  3.31, SD =  0.48), E(1,128) =  16.16, II < .001, and neutral primes (M = 3.27, SD =  0.49), 
E(1, 128) =  19.25, II < .0001.  There was no difference between religious primes and 
neutral primes, E(l, 128) < 1, ns.  We also calculated a planned comparison between pro-
socials and pro-selfs at the neutral priming level.  This indicated that pro-selfs (M =  3.43, 
SD =  0.47) gave higher might ratings of the partner than pro-socials (M =  3.11, SD =  0.45), 
E(1, 128) = 4.62, II < .05.  This difference was not significant at the religious and business 
priming level <.& < 1).  These results were in line with Hypothesis 7.  To examine 
Hypothesis 8 we calculated several additional correlations. 
Correlations between might impression of the partner and expectations of  partner's 
cooperation.  Correlations were significant at the business priming level for all participants 
and at the neutral priming level for HCon and LCon pro-selfs.  These significant 
correlations were all negative and ranged between -.61 and -.81. 
Correlations between might impression of the partner and cooperative behavior. 
Correlations were also significant at the business priming level for all participants and at 
the neutral priming level for HCon and LCon pro-selfs.  Significant correlations were all 
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Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 clearly replicated those of Smeesters et al. (in press). 
SVO and primes jointly influenced participants' expectations of partner's cooperation. 
Expectations of partner's cooperation assimilated to the primes for all participants. 
Cooperative behavior assimilated to these expectations in all conditions, except for HCon 
pro-selfs in the religious priming condition.  Thus, although expectations held by HCon 
pro-selfs assimilated to religious primes, their behavior contrasted with these primes.  The 
correlations corroborated this contrasting result by showing a negative correlation between 
expectations and behavior in this condition, whereas a positive correlation was found in all 
the other conditions. 
Our results also extended those of Smeesters et al. (in press) in several interesting 
ways.  First of all, we obtained the same results on cooperative behavior and expectations 
of partner's cooperation with stereotype primes.  Second and more important, we also 
measured partner impressions.  We found that SVO only influenced impressions in the 
neutral priming condition: pro-socials judged the partner as more moral than pro-selfs, who 
themselves judged the partner as mightier than pro-socials.  This is in line with the idea that 
morality is a chronically accessible construct for pro-socials and might for pro-selfs.  This 
pattern is also observed in the correlations.  Correlations calculated in the neutral priming 
condition between impression ratings on the one hand, and cooperative behavior or 
expectations of  partner's cooperation on the other, were only significant for those 
impression items that reflected a chronically accessible construct for either pro-socials (i.e., 
the moral scale) or pro-selfs (i.e., the might scale). About Prisoners and Dictators  - 26 
Further, priming had a clearly but asymmetric an influence on impressions.  There 
was no difference between the neutral primes and, respectively, business primes on the 
moral scale or religious primes on the might scale.  This means, for instance, that someone 
confronted with religious primes perceives hislher partner as being more moral but not as 
being less mighty.  Similarly, someone confronted with business primes perceives his/her 
partner as being mightier but not as being less moral.  This was also reflected in the 
correlations: correlations were not significant at the business priming level for the moral 
scale and at the religious priming level for the might scale.  To conclude, these impression 
correlations demonstrate that expectations of partner's cooperation are deri ved from a 
moral impression in the religious priming condition, a might impression in the business 
priming condition and participants' chronic constructs in the neutral priming condition. 
The results of Experiment 1 together with Smeesters et al. (in press) indicate that in 
an interdependence situation rumination about the character and the likely strategy of the 
partner is of high importance.  Indeed, people's expectations of partner's cooperation and 
impressions of the interaction partner became unobtrusively influenced by primes. 
Subsequently, these expectations and impressions were used to determine own cooperative 
decision-making (and not vice versa).  This is supported by the Heon pro-selfs' behavior. 
If they would use their own behavior as an antecedent of forming expectations and 
impressions, one would expect that their non-cooperative behavior in the religious priming 
condition would lead to low expectations of partner's cooperation and a less moral, or 
perhaps a mightier, partner impression.  However, the opposite happened.  That is, they had 
high expectations of partner's cooperation and a strong moral partner impression. About Prisoners and Dictators  - 27 
The findings obtained in this experiment suggest that, in settings characterized by a 
high interdependence, participants tend to focus on characteristics of the interaction partner 
in order to make cooperative choices (see also Herr, 1986; Neuberg, 1988).  We believe 
however that this pattern may not emerge in a situation in which an interdependent context 
is absent.  To begin looking for such a context, experiment 2 relied on an implicit 
procedure to test the notion that individuals in an interdependent context (i.e., a PD~) 
display a higher other-focus than individuals in a unilateral dependence context (i.e., a 
DO). 
Experiment 2 
In this experiment participants played either a PD~  or a DO and we measured the 
effects of being in one of these contexts on other-focus.  Experiment 1 clearly showed that 
individuals engage in rumination about partner beliefs and therefore it could be expected 
that individuals in an interdependent context have a high level of other-focus.  On the other 
hand, indiv.iduals participating in a DO may have a lower level of other-focus.  In a DO, 
characterized by unilateral dependence, rumination about partner beliefs may be of a lesser 
importance than in a PDO.  As a consequence, engaging in a DO may not lead to enhanced 
other-focus. 
In addition, we wanted to examine whether this other-focus is related to self-focus. 
The notion of self-focus has received considerable attention in the literature.  Increased 
self-focus (i.e., increased attention to the self) makes relevant goals more salient and more 
accessible and is related with an increasing instigation of self-regulation to bring one's 
functioning in line with one's goals or values (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, About Prisoners and Dictators  - 28 
1972; Gibbons, 1990; Higgins, 1996b).  Under such conditions, priming effects often 
disappear (Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 2000).  In many circumstances, with 
moderate levels of self-focus, human functioning is determined by the most dominant cue. 
In conditions with lowered self-focus, self-regulation fails to exert its influence and 
situational cues, such as primes, may take over human functioning (Carver & Scheier, 
1981).  The fact that in the PDG used in Experiment 1, the effects of self-related concepts 
such as SVO on rumination about partner beliefs were easily overridden by the primes 
could be the result of a decreased self-focus.  Therefore, it could be that in a PDG enhanced 
other-focus is related with decreased self-focus. 
Participants were invited to play either a PDG or a DG.  After we informed them 
about the rules of the game, we used a modified version of a laboratory task developed by 
Davis & Brock (1978) that could implicitly measure levels of other- and self-focus. 
Participants had to guess translations for personal pronouns in a foreign and unknown 
language.  Other-focus was determined by calculating the amount of second and third 
person pronouns used in the translations.  Self-focus was determined by the amount of first 
person pronouns used.  We also included a control condition in which participants were 
directly exposed to the translation task. 
The procedures for the different games were adapted from previous studies on DGs 
(cf. Bohnet & Frey, 1999) and PDGs (see Experiment 1) and differed with respect to the 
role of the interaction partner.  Nevertheless, we tried to keep the game procedures as 
constant as possible.  Apart from the role of the interaction partner, both games differed 
mainly from each other with respect to the number of chips that could be given to the 
partner (i.e., maximum 4 chips with a value of BEF 10 to the self and BEF 20 to the other About Prisoners and Dictators  - 29 
in the PD~  and maximum 8 chips with of value of BEF 5 to all in the DO).  We took care 
that there were equal references to the partner and the self in both games.  Therefore, 
differences in other- and self-focus between the different games could only be attributed to 
differences in the character of the specific game. 
We hypothesized that compared to a control condition, engaging in a PD~  would lead 
to enhanced other-focus and lowered self-focus, indicated by respectively a higher use of 
second- and third person pronouns and a lower use of first-person pronouns.  With respect 
to the DO, we had no reasons to expect differences in other- and self-focus between this 
game and the control condition.  We also expected a negative correlation between other-
and self-focus in the PD~. 
Method 
Participants and design.  Ninety-two Dutch-speaking undergraduates participated in 
partial fulfillment of course requirements.  The design of Experiment 2 was a single factor 
design (game type: PDG vs. DO vs. control condition). 
Procedure.  Participants were invited to the lab in groups of ten.  On arrival in the 
laboratory, participants were placed in individual cubicles and were told that they would 
participate in several studies6•  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three 
experimental conditions.  Participants in the control condition performed the task that 
measured the dependent variables (i.e., other- and self-focus). Participants in the two game 
conditions were first explained the rules of the game they were participating in.  They also 
had to make a behavioral choice in their game.  The dependent measure was 
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other- and self-focus task before making a choice, the other half had to perform this task 
after making a choice  7. 
Instructions for the prisoner's dilemma game.  Participants received the same 
instructions as in Experiment 1, except for the question on expectations of partner's 
cooperation.  All participants understood the task structure and, therefore, no additional 
data were excluded. 
Instructions for the dictator game.  Each participant was told that s/he was paired with 
another participant in the laboratory. Each participant was given eight chips and had to 
imagine that each chip was worth BEF 5.  It was told that the other person had not received 
anything.  The participant (i.e., the dictator) could unilaterally decide about the allocation 
of the chips.  The DO tested to which extent participants were willing to pass chips to the 
partner (i.e., the recipient).  Participants could either keep all of the chips for themselves, or 
allocate any proportion to the partner.  Participants did not receive any information about 
the partner.  All participants understood the game task and, therefore, no additional data 
were excluded. 
Dependent measures.  Each participant had to complete a 'foreign language test' that 
was constructed to measure other- and self-focus.  Participants were told that earlier 
research had shown that while reading a foreign language, people were sometimes able to 
guess the correct translation of pronouns.  We told participants that they would be 
presented with a short story in a foreign language with an unfamiliar character set (i.e., 
Cyrillic Russian) in which 50 pronouns were underlined.  We did not inform participants 
which language the story was presented in.  Participants were asked to guess the correct 
translation of each of the 50 pronouns.  Our main interest was the number of second- and About Prisoners and Dictators  - 31 
third-person pronouns (you, he, she, him, her, his) as a measure of other-focus and the 
number of first-person pronouns (I, me, my, myself, mine, 1 myself) as a measure of self-
focus.  Finally, we probed whether they had any suspicion about the experimental 
procedures.  None of the participants suspected any relatedness between their game and the 
other- and self-focus task.  Participants were then thanked and debriefed. 
Results and discussion 
An analysis of variance with game type as an independent variable revealed an effect 
on the other-focus measure, E(2, 89) =  15.47,12 < .0001.  Participants in a PD~  context eM 
=  16.87, SD =  3.56) listed more second- and third-person pronouns than participants in a 
DO context eM =  12.35, SD =  3.93), E(1, 89) =  26.33, 12 < .0001, or participants in the 
control condition eM =  12.96, SD =  2.87), E(I, 89) =  19.03,12 < .001.  There was no 
difference between participants playing a DO and control participants (.E < 1).  Next, an 
analysis of  game type revealed also a significant effect on the self-focus measure, E(2, 89) 
=  10.46,12< .0001.  Participants in a PD~  context eM =  10.94, SD =  2.80) listed fewer 
first-person pronouns than participants in a DO context eM =  13.45, SD =  3.34), E(1, 89) = 
11.47,12< .0001, or participants in the control condition eM =  14.20, SD =  2.64), E(1, 89) = 
18.74,12< .0001.  There was no difference between participants playing a DO and control 
participants, (.E < 1).  We also calculated correlations between other- and self-focus for 
each level of game type.  These correlations were significant in the PD~  (r = -.43) but not 
in the DO (r =  .15) and the control condition (r =  .07). 
Playing a PD~  leads to higher other-focus and lower self-focus than playing a DO. 
The higher spontaneous other-focus indicates that individuals in a PD~  are very much 
interested in the characteristics and functioning of the partner and, consequently, may About Prisoners and Dictators  - 32 
readily engage in rumination about partner beliefs.  Higher other-focus also tends to go 
along with lower self-focus, which may inhibit the effects of SVO on the rumination 
process. 
The DO gave rise to moderate levels of other- and self-focus.  Neither differed from 
the control condition.  Under such conditions, individuals may be not particularly focused 
on the characteristics and functioning of the partner and, consequently, not strongly engage 
in rumination about partner beliefs.  The moderate level of self-focus then suggests that 
cooperative behavior in a DO may be directly influenced by the most dominant cue (Carver 
& Scheier, 1981). 
Experiment 3 
In our view, the DO situation may in fact be quite close to what took place in Hertel 
& Fiedler's (1998) study.  Indeed, the interdependence character is likely to be weak in 
both cases.  In Hertel & Fiedler's (1998) study, participants presumably made cooperative 
decisions without having formed an impression of their partner.  In a DO, a game eliciting 
moderate levels of other-focus, people tend not to ruminate about partner's character during 
the task (see Roth, 1995).  Therefore, the results of Hertel & Fiedler (1998) (i.e., HCon 
individuals are less susceptible to priming effects) may be obtained if participants are 
confronted with a DO rather than a PD~. The moderate level of self-focus may then 
suggest that cooperative behavior in a DO will be influenced by the most dominant cue. 
Following Hertel & Fiedler (1998), SVO should be the most dominant cue for HCon 
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With respect to cooperative behavior, we predicted a significant interaction between 
consistency and stereotype primes.  Primes were only expected to influence cooperative 
behavior of Leon individuals but not of Reon individuals (Hypothesis 1).  Further, we also 
predicted effects of SVO, though of a different nature for Heon and Leon individuals.  For 
Heon individuals, we predicted an effect of SVO regardless of the nature of the primes 
(Hypothesis 2).  For Leon individuals, SVO was only expected to influence cooperative 
behavior when primes were neutral (Hypothesis 3). 
Because impressions were not expected to playa major role and because other-focus 
tended to be low in a DG, we did not expect our participants to engage in rumination about 
the character of their partner.  Therefore, we did not expect primes to influence partner 
impressions.  Nevertheless, we expected SVO to have an influence on partner impressions. 
This is rather a consequence of how individuals with different SVO perceive the world, 
which may occur independent of whether impression formation is a predominant cognitive 
process or not.  Because morality is a chronically accessible construct for pro-socials and 
might is for pro-selfs, we expected pro-socials to perceive their partner as being more 
moral than pro-selfs do (Hypothesis 4) and pro-selfs to perceive their partner as being 
mightier than pro-socials do (Hypothesis 5). 
Finally, because we did not expect impressions to play an important role as an 
antecedent of cooperative decision-making and cooperative behavior is rather the result of 
the direct influence of SVO (Heon individuals) or primes (Leon individuals), we did not 
expect a systematic relationship between cooperative behavior and impressions 
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Method 
Participants and design.  Participants were 169 Dutch-speaking undergraduates who 
participated for partial fulfillment of course requirements.  The experimental design 
included three between-participants factors: SVO (pro-social versus pro-self), consistency 
(high versus low), and stereotype primes (religious versus neutral versus business). 
Dependent variables were participants' cooperative behavior in a DO, and moral and might 
impressions of the partner. 
Procedure and materials.  After participants entered the laboratory, they were told that 
they would participate in a sequence of tasks and were then brought to individual cubicles. 
They were requested to perform a sequence of tasks: (a) Ring Measure of Social Values 
(Liebrand, 1984), (b) a filler task, (c) a subliminal priming procedure, (d) a DO, (e) 
impression ratings of the partner, and (f) a post-experimental questionnaire. 
Measuring social value orientation and consistency.  Participants were invited to the 
lab in groups of ten persons.  The procedure of this experiment was very similar to 
Experiment 1, except for the instructions of the experimental game participants had to 
perform.  As in Experiment 1, participants first completed the Ring Measure of Social 
Values (Liebrand, 1984).  Participants were classified according the same criteria as in 
Experiment 1.  Of the 169 participants, 85 could be identified as pro-socials and 81  could 
be identified as pro-selfs.  Three participants could not be identified because they had an 
orientation vector of 22.5°.  The average level of consistency was 89.4%.  Of the remaining 
166 participants, 80 could be labeled as HCon individuals and 80 could be labeled as LCon 
individuals.  Six additional participants were discarded from the analysis because they 
exhibited a consistency score that was lower than 60%.  This means that a total of 160 About Prisoners and Dictators  - 35 
participants remained for the analysis.  Thirty-nine participants were classified as RCon 
pro-socials, 42 participants as LCon pro-socials, 41 participants as RCon pro-selfs, and 38 
participants as LCon pro-selfs. 
Priming manipulation.  After all participants took part in a filler-task, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the three subliminal priming conditions (see Experiment 
1). 
Measuring cooperative behavior in a dictator game.  Immediately after completing the 
priming task, participants took part in the same DG as in Experiment 2.  All participants 
understood the task and, therefore, no additional data were excluded. 
Impression ratings of the partner and post-experimental questionnaire.  Following the 
behavioral choice, participants were asked to fill out the same impression questionnaire as 
in Experiment 1.  Finally, before being thanked and debriefed, participants had to perform 
the same funneled debriefing form as in Experiment 1.  None of the participants indicated 
any suspicion on the priming procedure or on any relatedness among the different tasks of 
the experiment. 
Results 
Cooperative behavior. We conducted a 2 (SVO: pro-social vs. pro-self) x 2 
(consistency: high vs. low) x 3 (stereotype primes: religious vs. neutral vs. business) 
between-participants ANOV  A on the number of chips that participants allocated to the 
partner in the DG.  This analysis revealed the presence of two significant main effects.  A 
main effect of SVO, .E(l, 148) = 37.53, p < .001, indicated that pro-socials (M = 3.55, SD = 
1.14) allocated more chips than pro-selfs (M =  2.51, SD = 1.19).  A main effect of About Prisoners and Dictators  - 36 
stereotype primes, E(2, 148) = 9.69, 12. < .001, revealed that religious primes (M = 3.52, SD 
= 1.15) elicited significantly more cooperative behavior than neutral primes (M =  2.95, SD 
= 1.27), whereas business primes (M = 2.62, SD = 1.23) elicited significantly less 
cooperative behavior than neutral primes. 
We obtained two significant two-way interactions.  The two-way interaction between 
SVO and consistency, E(1,  148) = 5.57, 12. < .05, showed that the difference in cooperative 
behavior between Heon pro-socials and Heon pro-selfs [M = 3.73, SD = 1.12 vs. M = 
2.29, SD = 1.27, E(l, 148) = 36.06, 12. < .0001] was larger than between Leon pro-socials 
and Leon pro-selfs [M = 3.36, SD = 1.14 vs. M = 2.72, SD = 1.06, E(l, 148) = 7.08, 12. < 
.01], !(I58) = 3.98,12. < .0001.  In line with Hypothesis 1, we obtained a significant two-
way interaction between consistency and primes, E(2, 148) = 5.20, 12. < .01.  The means of 
this interaction are shown in Figure 3.  This interaction showed that priming did not 
influence Heon individuals, .E(2,  148) < 1, ns, whereas it had a major impact on Leon 
individuals, .E(2,  148) = 14.73,12. < .0001.  For the latter individuals, religious primes (M = 
3.87, SD = 0.87) elicited more cooperative behavior than neutral primes (M = 2.94, SD = 
1.11), E(l, 148) = 10.01,12 < .0001, and business primes (M = 2.31, SD = 0.83) elicited less 
cooperative behavior than neutral primes, E(l, 148) =  4.46, 12. < .05. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Furthermore, for Heon individuals the effect of SVO on cooperative behavior 
appeared to be significant for each type of prime.  Heon pro-socials cooperated more than 
Heon pro-selfs with religious priming (M = 3.93, SD = 1.07 vs. M = 2.38, SD = 1.04), E(l, About Prisoners and Dictators  - 37 
148) =  13.96,1'. < .0001, neutral priming eM =  3.58, SD =  1.24 vs. M =  2.33, SD =  1.34), 
E(1,  148) =  9.05, 1'. < .01, and business priming eM =  3.69, SD =  1.11  vs. M =  2.15, SD = 
1.46), E(I, 148) =  13.37,1'. < .001.  This result confirmed Hypothesis 2. 
For LCon individuals, the effects of SVO appeared to be significant after neutral 
priming only, which confirmed Hypothesis 3.  LCon pro-socials cooperated more than 
LCon pro-selfs with neutral priming eM =  3.42, SD =  0.99 vs. M =  2.46, SD =  1.05), Eel, 
148) =  4.95,1'. < .05, but not with religious priming eM =  4.13, SD =  0.92 and M = 3.62, 
SD = 0.77), E(1,  148) =  1.62, ns, and business priming eM =  2.53, SD =  0.91 and M =  2.08, 
SD =  0.67), E(1,  148) = 1.17, ns.  The difference between LCon pro-socials and LCon pro-
selfs was marginally significantly larger with neutral priming than with religious priming, 
!(51) = 1.61,1'. < .06, and significantly larger than with business priming, 1(50) = 1.81,1'. < 
.05.  Differences in means between LCon pro-socials and LCon pro-selfs did not differ 
between the religious and the business priming conditions, 1(53) < 1, ns. 
Impressions  of the  partner.  As  in  Experiment  1,  we  first  performed  a  principal 
component analysis (PCA) to see whether the 8 impression items indeed could be reduced 
to a moral scale and a might scale.  This PCA revealed two components with an eigenvalue 
greater than one. The first component had an eigenvalue of 3.01  and accounted for 37.75% 
of the  total  variance.  After  Varimax  rotation  4  items  (honest,  fair,  sincere,  equitable) 
loaded highly on  this component. These four items referred to  a moral impression scale 
(Cronbach's a = 0.76). The second component had an eigenvalue of 1.32 and accounted for 
16.55%  of  the  total  variance.  Three  items  (dominant,  self-assured,  intelligent)  loaded 
highly on this component. The item  'determined' did not load highly on this component. 
Therefore,  a  might  impression  scale  was  created  without  incorporating  this  item About Prisoners and Dictators  - 38 
(Cronbach's ex =  0.72). 
To test Hypothesis 4 and 5,  we conducted separate 2 (SVO: pro-social vs. pro-self) x 
2  (consistency:  high  vs.  low) x  3  (stereotype primes:  religious  vs.  neutral  vs.  business) 
between-subjects ANOV  As on the moral and might impression ratings of the partner.  An 
analysis on the moral impression scale revealed a main effect of SVO, .Eel,  148) = 10.91, p. 
< .01.  Pro-socials CM = 3.46, SD =  0.67) judged the partner as more moral than pro-selfs 
CM = 3.14, SD = 0.59).  This result confirmed Hypothesis 4.  The ANOV  A on the might 
impression confirmed Hypothesis 5, although the main effect of SVO was only marginally 
significant, .EO,  148) =  3.16, p. =  .07.  Pro-selfs (M =  3.28, SD =  0.63) judged the partner as 
mightier than pro-socials CM = 3.12, SD = 0.57). 
Correlations between impression ratings and cooperative behavior.  In line with 
Hypothesis 6, it appeared that none of the correlations between either a moral judgment and 
cooperative behavior or a might judgment and cooperative behavior were significant. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 were quite similar to the findings of Hertel & Fiedler 
(1998): priming only influenced cooperative behavior of LCon individuals and not of 
HCon individuals.  In addition, our results also showed the influence of SVO on 
cooperative behavior in a DO: SVO determined cooperative behavior of HCon individuals 
in all priming conditions whereas it only determined cooperative behavior of LCon 
individuals in the neutral priming condition. 
Partner impressions were not affected by priming.  They were only affected  by SVO, 
even for LCon individuals: only the behavioral effects of SVO were weakened by the About Prisoners and Dictators  - 39 
religious or business primes.  The effects of SVO on partner impressions were not, which 
suggests that impression formation is not a predominant process in the context of DG. 
Consequently, priming could not have had much of an influence.  Hence, there was no 
competing cue available to disrupt the influence of low consistent orientations on the 
impression ratings.  These impressions may then convey the way individuals taking part in 
a DG perceive their social world. 
The correlations showed that cooperative behavior and partner impressions were not 
related to each other.  Thus, cooperative responses towards the other were not elicited by 
moral or might impressions of the other.  This strengthens the interpretation that 
cooperative behavior in a DG is rather the result of direct influences of SVO or primes. 
Experiments 4 and 5 
The.previous experiments taught us that a) the impact of SVO, consistency, and 
stereotypes primes on cooperative behavior yielded different data patterns for a PDG and a 
DG, and b) a PDG game had different levels of other- and self-focus than a DG.  One could 
however argue that these different findings for the PDG and the DG are not directly 
comparable to each other.  First of all, different numbers of chips with different values 
were used.  In the PDG, participants had to imagine that four chips were each worth BEF 
10 to the self and BEF 20 to the other.  In the DG, participants had to imagine that eight 
chips were each worth BEF 5 to both the self and the other.  These different amounts might 
have elicited different perceptions on how to deal with these chips.  Second, although we 
tried to keep the instructions for both types of games as constant as possible, sometimes 
different instructions had to be used because of the different procedures for the games. About Prisoners and Dictators  - 40 
This could also have had a strong effect on the degree of other- and self-focus.  In order to 
eliminate any possible confounds we decided to conduct another study in which the 
conditions of both the PD~  and the DO were matched as closely as possible. 
We wanted to directly compare a social interaction with moderate levels of other- and 
self-focus with a social interaction with a high level of other-focus and a low level self-
focus.  For the first social interaction, we used the DO that was used in Experiment 3.  We 
only adapted the amount of money involved in the game.  For the latter social interaction, 
we used a modified version of a DO (called dictator-other game, DO-other).  Participants in 
this condition had to playa classic DO and were told that they were linked to another 
person, to whom they had to make an allocation decision (i.e., the recipient), and that this 
other person had to play the same game in the role of a dictator and with the participant as a 
recipient.  Unlike in Hertel & Fiedler (1998), participants were immediately linked with a 
partner.  We assumed that pointing participants to a person making allocations to them 
would enhance attention to hislher characteristics.  Presumably, in such an enhanced 
interdependence situation, individuals will also engage in rumination about partner beliefs. 
In addition, we told participants that the other person would only learn about what slhe 
would receive from the participant after making hislher own choice.  This was done in 
order to minimize the likelihood of strategic choices.  Remember that in the PD~ 
(Experiment 1) choices were made simultaneously and under such conditions participants 
knew that the other person would be ignorant of their choices.  Further, to completely 
prevent that other- and self-focus differences could be attributed to these extra instructions 
to participants in the DO-other condition, participants in the DO condition received almost 
the same instructions.  Here we simply stated that the other person was not going to play About Prisoners and Dictators  - 41 
the same game as a dictator and slhe would not be infonned about the participant's decision 
before the end of the session.  By doing this, rumination about partner's personality was not 
instigated and the number of references to the self and to the other was set equal. 
We conducted two experiments to test the viability and validity of this paradigm.  In 
Experiment 4, we examined the effects of both types of games (the DG and the DG-other) 
on other- and self-focus.  We predicted that the DG-other would have the same 
characteristics as a PDG (i.e., a higher other-focus and a lower self-focus).  In Experiment 
5, we used our new paradigm to examine whether the data pattern of cooperative behavior 
obtained in Experiments 1 and 3 could be replicated.  We did this by using only Reon 
individuals.  We decided to not use Leon individuals because they basically showed the 
same data pattern of cooperative behavior in the PDG and in the DG, although their 
behavior may have been differentially triggered in these different games.  In the PDG, 
cooperative behavior of Leon individuals was rather determined by default nonns 
associated with partner impressions and expectations of partner's cooperative behavior, 
which were affected by stereotype primes (Smeesters et aI., 2002).  In the DG, cooperative 
behavior of Leon individuals was directly influenced by stereotype primes.  For 
Experiment 5, we predicted the same effects for the DG condition as in Experiment 3 and 
for the DG-other condition as in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 4 
This experiment was conducted to examine whether participants playing a DG-other 
had a higher other-focus and a lower self-focus than participants playing a DG.  We 
followed the same procedure as in Experiment 2, and also included a control condition. About Prisoners and Dictators  - 42 
Method 
Participants and design. Forty-seven Dutch-speaking undergraduates participated for 
partial fulfillment of course requirements.  The design of Experiment 4 was a single-factor 
design (game type: DG vs. DG-other vs. control condition). 
Procedure.  We followed almost the same procedure as in Experiment 2.  Participants 
were invited to the lab in groups of eight persons.  After participants were placed in 
individual cubicles and told that they would participate in several studies8, they were then 
randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions.  Participants in the control 
conditions just had to perform the dependent measure.  Participants in the two experimental 
conditions were first explained the rules of the game they were participating in. 
Participants in the DG condition received the same instructions as in Experiment 2. 
In this experiment, however, participants received 10 coins of € 0.20, which they had to 
allocate between themselves and another person.  Further instructions stated that the other 
person did not have to play the same game in the role of a dictator and that slbe would not 
be informed about the allocation decision of the participant before the end of the 
experiment.  Participants in the DG-other condition received the same instructions but were 
also told that the other person had to play the same game, then with reversed roles (i.e., the 
recipient becomes a dictator and the dictator becomes a recipient).  In addition, participants 
were also told that the other person would not be informed about the allocation decision of 
the participant before making a choice himselflberself. 
After these instructions and counterbalanced with the own choice9, participants had to 
complete the same dependent measure as in Experiment 2.  Participants were then 
debriefed, told that the game was fictitious, informed that there was no other person who About Prisoners and Dictators  - 43 
had to make a choice, and thanked.  Participants were allowed to keep the coins that they 
did not allocate to the other for themselves. 
Results and discussion. 
The data were analyzed using an ANOV  A with game type as a single-factor and 
which was conducted on both the other-focus and the self-focus measure.  The analyses on 
the other-focus measure revealed that game type had an effect, f:(2, 44) =  5.67, 12 < .01. 
Participants in the dictator-other dilemma condition game used more second- and third-
person pronouns (M = 17.12, SD = 4.01) than participants in the DG condition CM =  13.13, 
SD = 3.78), ..E(1, 44) = 8.74, 12 < .01, and the control condition (M = 13.33, SD = 3.58), ..EO, 
44) = 7.88, 12 < .01.  No difference appeared between the latter two conditions (..E < 1).  The 
ANOV  A had also an effect on the self-focus measure, ..E(2, 44) = 3.94, 12 < .05.  Participants 
in the DG-other condition CM = 11.06, SD =  2.70) used fewer first-person pronouns than 
participants in the DG condition (M = 14.21, SD = 3.76), ..E(1, 44) =  6.39, 12 < .05, and the 
control condition, CM = 13.87, SD = 4.02), ..EO, 44) =  5.11,12< .05.  There was no 
difference between the latter two conditions (..E < 1).  We also calculated correlations 
between other- and self-focus for each level of game type and found a significant 
correlation in the DG-other condition (r = -.51) but not in the DG condition (r = -.08) and 
the control condition (r = .11). 
Clearly, the data in the DG-other condition in Experiment 4 matched those of the 
PDG condition in Experiment 2.  It had higher levels of other-focus and lower levels of 
self-focus than engaging in a DG condition, which did not differ from the control 
condition.  Therefore, we assumed the use of the two versions of the dictator game is 
suitable for replicating the patterns of cooperative behavior obtained in Experiments 1 and About Prisoners and Dictators  - 44 
3. 
Experiment 5 
Experiments 1 and 3 showed different patterns of cooperative behavior for HCon 
individuals.  These results were, however, obtained with different procedures.  We decided 
to develop a more sophisticated paradigm for replicating these results.  If  we succeed in 
replicating these results, we can be confident that the results obtained in Experiments 1 and 
3 were not the result of different procedures.  We decided to test this conjecture only for 
HCon individuals, as only the data patterns of cooperative behavior for HCon individuals 
were different in Experiments 1 and 3.  Participants were classified after performing the 
Ring Measure of Social Values as HCon and LCon individuals.  HCon individuals took 
part in Experiment 5 and LCon individuals took part in Experiment 6 (see below). 
In the DO, we only predicted a main effect of SVO: HCon pro-socials were expected 
to behave more cooperatively than HCon pro-selfs (Hypothesis 1).  In the DO-other, we 
predicted religious primes to elicit more cooperative behavior than neutral or business 
primes among HCon pro-socials but not among HCon pro-selfs (Hypothesis 2). 
Method. 
Participants and design.  A group of 288 undergraduates participated in this 
experiment or Experiment 6.  They took part for partial fulfillment of course requirements. 
All were native Dutch speakers. The experimental design of Experiment 5 included three 
between-participants factors.  These factors were SVO (pro-social versus pro-self), About Prisoners and Dictators  - 45 
stereotype primes (religious versus neutral versus business), and game type (DO vs. DO-
other).  The dependent variable was cooperative behavior. 
Procedure.  Participants were invited in the lab in groups of 8 persons and told that 
they had to perform a sequence of tasks.  The sequence in this experiment was a) the Ring 
Measure of Social Values followed by b) a filler task, c) a subliminal priming procedure, d) 
an experimental game, and e) a post-experimental questionnaire. 
As in previous experiments, participants first completed the Ring Measure of Social 
Values (Liebrand, 1984).  Participants were however not classified according the same 
criteria for consistency as in Experiment 1 and 3, in which a median split was used after 
categorizing participants as either pro-socials or pro-selfs.  Instead we used the criteria of 
Smeesters et al. (in press) who classified participants with a consistency score of at least 
90% as Heon individuals and participants with a consistency score of at most 85% as 
Leon individuals.  They omitted the participants scoring in between.  Their classification 
was matched by a median split.  We used these criteria because we were then able to 
immediately classify participants to either let them participate in Experiment 5 or 6.  The 
Ring Measure data of all participants were written to a disk to which only the experimenter 
had access.  The experimenter scanned these data while participants were performing a 
filler task that took about 15 minutes.  Participants then received different instructions 
depending on their consistency score. 
Of the 288 participants, 141 who scored at least 90% were classified as Heon 
individuals and 135 who scored 85% or less were classified as Leon individualsIO.  Twelve 
participants, who scored below 60% (7 participants) or between 85% and 90% (5 
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88.1 %.  Of the 141 Reon individuals, 73 could be labeled as pro-socials and 65 as pro-
selfs.  Three participants could not be classified because they had an orientation vector of 
22.5°. 
Priming manipulation.  After a filler-experiment, participants were randomly assigned 
to one of three subliminal priming conditions (see Experiments 1 and 3). 
Game manipulation and measuring cooperative behavior.  Next, participants were 
randomly assigned to either the DG condition or the DG-other condition (see Experiment 
4).  All participants understood the game and, therefore, no additional data were excluded. 
Finally, before being thanked and debriefed, all participants were requested to follow a 
funneled debriefing procedure.  None of the participants indicated any suspicion on the 
priming procedure or on any relatedness among the different tasks of the experiment. 
Results and discussion 
The amount of coins that participants allocated to the other was analyzed in a 2 
(SVO: pro-social vs. pro-self) x 3 (stereotype primes: religious vs. neutral vs. business) x 2 
(game type: DG vs. DO-other) between-participants ANOV  A.  This analysis revealed a 
main effect of SVO, .EO,  126) = 34.65, p < .0001.  Pro-socials (M = 3.69, SD = 1.36) 
allocated more coins to the other than pro-selfs (M = 2.42, SD = 1.26).  Further, we 
obtained a significant three-way interaction between SVO, stereotype primes, and game 
type, .Ee2,  126) =  3.29, 12 < .05.  The means pertaining to this interaction are presented in 
Figure 4.  To test our hypotheses, we conducted two separate 2 (SVO: pro-social vs. pro-
self) x 3  (stereotype primes: religious vs. neutral vs. business) between-participants 
ANOV  As for participants in the DG condition and the DO-other condition. About Prisoners and Dictators  - 47 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
In line with Hypothesis 1, the ANOV A for participants in the DG condition only 
revealed a main effect of SVO, .E(l, 59) = 12.68,12 < .001.  HCon pro-socials eM = 3.82, 
SD = 1.40) allocated more coins to the other than HCon pro-selfs eM = 2.56, SD = 1.37). 
The ANOV  A for participants in the DG-other condition revealed main effects of 
SVO, .EO, 67) = 24.41, 12 < .0001, and stereotype primes, .E(2, 67) = 4.38,12 < .05.  HCon 
pro-socials (M =  3.57, SD =  1.32) behaved more cooperatively than HCon pro-selfs eM = 
2.28, SD = 1.16).  Business primes eM =  2.38, SD = 1.21) elicited less allocations to the 
partner than religious eM =  3.19, SD = 1.66) or neutral primes eM =  3.21, SD =  1.14). 
These main effects were however qualified by a significant two-way interaction between 
SVO and stereotype primes, .E(2, 67) = 6.10, 12 < .01.  To analyze this interaction, we broke 
down the sum of squares associated with the priming effect into two orthogonal a 12riori 
Helmert contrasts. The first contrast (CI) compared the religious priming condition to the 
neutral and business priming conditions. The second contrast (C2) compared the neutral 
priming condition to the business priming condition. We then examined whether CI and 
C2 interacted with SVO.  We expected the interaction between C1  and SVO to be 
significant, unlike the interaction between C2 and SVO. 
The C1  contrast, .EO, 67) =  2.08, ns was not significant.  In line with our predictions 
C1  interacted with SVO, .E(1, 67) = 11.60,12 < .01.  For HCon pro-socials, cooperative 
behavior was higher in the religious priming condition eM =  4.46, SD =  0.97) than in the 
neutrallbusiness priming conditions eM =  3.13, SD = 1.26) 1(35) =  3.32, 12 < .01. 
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religious priming condition CM = 1.92, SD = 1.16) and the neutrallbusiness priming 
conditions CM =  2.46, SD = 1.14), !(34) =  -1.33, ns.  The C2 contrast was significant, 
E(l,67) =  6.67, 12 < .05.  Business primes CM =  2.38, SD =  1.21) elicited less cooperative 
behavior than neutral primes CM = 3.21, SD = 1.14).  As expected, C2 did not interact with 
SVO, E(l, 67) < 1, ns.  These results confirmed Hypothesis 2. 
The results of Experiment 5 were perfectly in line with our predictions.  We obtained 
only a main effect of SVO in the DO condition.  In the DO-other condition we observed 
that HCon pro-selfs showed non-cooperative behavior in the religious priming condition 
whereas in the same condition HCon pro-socials behaved cooperatively.  All HCon 
individuals behaved less cooperatively in the business priming condition compared to the 
neutral priming condition. 
In a condition with moderate levels of other and self-focus, SVO was the most 
dominant cue to determine cooperative behavior for HCon individuals.  In a condition with 
a high level of other-focus and a low level of self-focus another pattern of cooperative 
behavior emerged.  This pattern matched the pattern obtained for HCon individuals in 
Experiment 1 (the PD~)  and the patterns obtained for HCon individuals in the studies of 
Smeesters et al. (in press).  In the previous experiments, rumination about partner beliefs 
tended to playa major role, which determined cooperative behavior.  Therefore, as this 
complicated pattern of cooperative behavior for HCon individuals is similar to the previous 
mentioned studies, we believe that the same ruminating process may have played a role in 
the DO-other condition.  Strong support for this assumption comes from the fact that we 
obtained the same pattern of other- and self-focus in the DO-other condition in Experiment 
4 as in the PD~  condition in Experiment 2.  Further, if SVO and primes would directly About Prisoners and Dictators  - 49 
affect cooperative behavior in the DG-other, we should have obtained the same pattern of 
data as in the DG, which did not occur. 
Experiment 6 
LCon individuals always tend to be very vulnerable to primes, much more than HCon 
individuals.  The difference is most remarkable in the DG.  In this game, the level of other-
focus appeared too low to instigate rumination about partner beliefs.  Additionally, the 
level of self-focus was also moderate, and then the most dominant cue tends to dominate 
behavior.  SVO completely dominated cooperative behavior of HCon individuals for all 
prime types, whereas it only influenced cooperative behavior of LCon individuals 
confronted with neutral primes.  Primes however dominated the influence of SVO on 
cooperative behavior of LCon individuals.  Hertel & Fiedler (1998) argued that individuals 
with HCon orientations have strong dispositions and should not be susceptible to priming. 
Individuals with LCon orientations, on the other hand, have weak orientations and should 
be very susceptible to priming. 
The present experiment was conducted to test whether it is possible to override these 
priming effects for LCon individuals in the DG.  In other words, is it possible to make 
LCon individuals behave as HCon individuals?  We believe that this can be made possible 
by increasing the level of self-focus for these individuals.  Under conditions of increased 
self-focus, individuals' relevant goals should become more accessible and individuals 
should be more inclined to bring one's behavior in line with their goals (Carver &  Scheier, 
1981; Gibbons, 1990; Higgins, 1996b).  These goals should then inhibit action tendencies 
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should be able to increase the activation level of the weak SVO of Leon individuals, 
thereby inhibiting the influence of stereotype primes on their cooperative behavior. 
Experiment 6 included only Leon individuals who had to playa DO.  Half of these 
participants had to perform a self-focus increasing task, whereas the other half had to 
perform a neutral task.  Participants in this experiment were the Leon individuals to whom 
we referred in Experiment 5.  For Leon individuals in the increased self-focus condition, 
we expected results to be similar to the results of Heon individuals in the DO of 
Experiment 3.  For Leon individuals in the self-focus control condition, we expected 
results to be similar to the results of Leon individuals in Experiment 3. 
More specifically, we predicted a significant interaction between stereotype primes 
and self-focus: the effect of primes was expected to be significant in the self-focus control 
condition but not in the increased self-focus condition (Hypothesis 1).  Further, we also 
predicted effects of SVO, although differently for the increased self-focus and the control 
condition.  In the increased self-focus condition, we predicted an effect of SVO in each 
priming condition (Hypothesis 2).  In the self-focus control condition, SVO was only 
expected to influence cooperative behavior in the neutral priming condition (Hypothesis 3). 
Method. 
Participants and design.  Participants were part of a larger group of 288 
undergraduates who participated in Experiments 5 or 6 for partial fulfillment of course 
requirements.  The design was a 2 (SVO: pro-social vs. pro-selfs) x 3 (stereotype primes: 
religious vs. neutral vs. business) x 2 (self-focus: increase vs. control) between-subjects 
design.  The dependent variable was cooperative behavior in a DO. About Prisoners and Dictators  - 51 
Procedure.  Participants were invited to the lab in groups of eight persons.  After 
being welcomed in the lab and placed in individual cubicles, participants started the 
experiment by performing the Ring Measure of Social Values.  Of the 135 LCon 
individuals that took part (see Experiment 5), 70 could be labeled as pro-socials and 63 as 
pro-selfs.  Two participants could not be classified because they had an orientation vector 
of 22.5°. 
Self-focus manipulation.  Following a filler task, participants were confronted with a 
translation task, which was used to increase self-focus for half of the participants. 
Participants received 12 sentences written in Cyrillic Russian.  In each sentence, one word 
had to be translated.  For participants in the increased self-focus condition, all these words 
were first-person pronouns.  Participants had to use the following words: I, me,!ill:, myself, 
mine, or lmyself.  Earlier research has demonstrated that using first-person pronouns 
during a task increases self-focus (cf. Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Stapel & Tesser, 2001). 
For participants in the self-focus control condition, the "to-be-translated" words were all 
related to locations.  They had to use the following words: £i!y, village, place, parish, 
district, or hamlet.  One participant reported being familiar with Russian.  The data from 
this person were excluded from the analysis.  As a consequence, 69 pro-socials and 63 pro-
selfs were left for the analysis. 
Following this task, participants were randomly assigned to one of the three priming 
conditions.  All participants completed the DG used in Experiment 5.  Finally, before being 
debriefed and thanked, participants completed a funneled debriefing procedure.  None of 
the participants indicated any suspicion on the priming procedure or on any relatedness 
among tasks. About Prisoners and Dictators  - 52 
Results and discussions. 
We conducted a 2 (SVO: pro-social vs. pro-self) x 3 (stereotype primes: religious vs. 
neutral vs. business) x 2 (self-focus: increase vs. control) between-participants ANOV  A on 
the number of coins individuals allocated to the other in a DG.  This analysis revealed two 
main effects.  A main effect of SVO revealed that pro-socials CM = 3.92, SD = 1.65) 
allocated more coins toward the other than pro-selfs did CM = 2.74, SD = 1.70), .EO,  120) = 
18.11, Q < .0001.  A main effect of primes, .Ee2,  120) = 6.98, Q < .01, showed that religious 
primes CM = 3.93, SD = 1.65) elicited more cooperative behavior than neutral primes C.M = 
3.39, SD = 1.81) and that business primes CM = 2.66, SD = 1.66) elicited less cooperative 
behavior than neutral primes. 
The two-way interaction between stereotype primes and self-focus was significant, 
.E(2,  120) = 3.60, Q < .05.  This interaction revealed that priming had an effect in the self-
focus control condition, .E(2,  120) =  9.59, Q < .001, but not in the increased self-focus 
condition, .E(2,  120) < 1, ns.  The means of this interaction are shown in Figure 5.  For 
LCon individuals in the self-focus control condition, religious primes CM =  4.42, SD = 
0.98) elicited more cooperative behavior than neutral primes CM = 3.25, SD = 1.45), .EO, 
120) = 5.63, Q < .05, and business primes CM = 2.27, SD = 1.38) elicited less cooperative 
behavior than neutral primes, .EO,  120) = 4.01, Q < .05. 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
Furthermore, the effect of SVO on cooperative behavior appeared to be significant in 
each priming condition of the self-focus increase condition.  LCon pro-socials cooperated About Prisoners and Dictators  - 53 
more than Leon pro-selfs in the religious priming condition (M =  4.42, SD = 1.73 vs. M = 
2.45, SD =  1.81), E(1, 120) = 8.76, 12 < .01, the neutral priming condition CM = 4.25, SD = 
1.76 vs. M =  2.82, SD =  2.27), E(l, 120) =  4.67, 12 < .05, and the business priming 
condition (M =  3.75, SD =  1.48 vs. M =  2.36, SD = 1.96), E(1, 120) =  4.38, 12 < .OS.  These 
results confirmed Hypothesis 2. 
In the self-focus control condition, the effects of SVO appeared to be marginally 
significant in the neutral priming condition.  Leon pro-socials cooperated more than Leon 
pro-selfs in the neutral priming condition (M =  3.91, SD =  1.76 vs. M =  2.60, SD =  0.S2), 
E(l, 120) =  3.56, 12 < .07, but not in the religious priming condition CM =  4.64, SD =  1.12 
and M = 4.20, SD = 0.78), E(1, 120) < 1, ns, and the business priming condition CM = 2.55, 
SD = 1.37 and M =  2.00, SD = 1.41), .E(1,  120) < 1, ns.  The difference between Leon pro-
socials and Leon pro-selfs was significantly larger in the neutral priming condition than in 
the religious priming condition, 1(SI) =  2.28, 12 < .01, and the business priming condition, 
1(S1) = 1.74,12 < .01.  Differences in means between Leon pro-socials and Leon pro-selfs 
did not differ between the religious priming condition and the business priming condition, 
1(S1) < 1, ns. 
Increasing self-focus inhibited priming effects on Leon individuals' cooperative 
behavior.  Instead, their behavior was brought in line with their SVO, which is consistent 
with the literature (e.g., Gibbons, 1990).  As a result, Leon individuals acted as if they 
were Heon individuals.  Enhancing self-focus does not affect the activation of stereotypes, 
but rather their application (Dijksterhuis &  Van Knippenberg, 1998; Macrae, Bodenhausen, 
& Milne, 1998).  Therefore, the absence of priming effects cannot be attributed to the fact 
that enhanced self-focus does led to a more superficial processing of the priming material. About Prisoners and Dictators  - 54 
General discussion 
The set of experiments we presented here illustrates how different experimental 
games yielded different patterns of cooperative behavior.  Moreover, these games also 
differed in terms of other- and self-focus.  Experiment I started from research by Smeesters 
et al. (in press), who demonstrated that SVO and primes strongly influenced expectations 
of partner's cooperation in a PD~. These expectations may then have been used to 
determine cooperative behavior.  We replicated and extended this research by using 
stereotype primes instead of trait primes and by measuring participants' impressions about 
the partner.  The interpretation of the observed intriguing behavioral pattern, with a strong 
non-cooperative reaction of HCon pro-selfs in the religious priming condition, supported 
the hypothesis that rumination about partner beliefs is a predominant cognitive activity in a 
PD~. We thought this may be expressed by way of an enhanced attention or focus to the 
partner.  In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that playing a PD~  led to enhanced other-focus 
but also to lowered self-focus.  This latter finding could explain why primes overrode the 
effects of SVO on expectations and impressions. 
Further, Experiment 2 also demonstrates that a DO does not have the same 
characteristics as the PD~  in terms of other- and self-focus.  Instead, this game represents 
moderate levels of other- and self-focus.  Building on the assumption that rumination about 
partner beliefs does not play an important role in a DO, we hypothesized that SVO and 
primes would directly affect cooperative responses.  Indeed, Experiment 3 suggests that 
SVO determine cooperative behavior for HCon individuals and that primes determine 
cooperative behavior for LCon individuals.  These findings confirm Hertel & Fiedler's About Prisoners and Dictators  - 55 
(1998) results, which were also obtained in a situation in which rumination about partner's 
character were likely minimized. 
The findings on cooperative behavior and other-and self-focus in Experiments 1-3 
were obtained with procedures that differed from each other (e.g., sometimes different 
instructions, different amounts of cooperative behavior to be given to the partner). 
Therefore, we directly compared a classic DO with a similar DO that may instigate more 
rumination about partner beliefs (called DO-other).  Experiment 4 replicated the results of 
Experiment 2.  Experiment 5 was conducted with HCon individuals only and we replicated 
the results of Experiment 1 in the DO-other and the results of Experiment 3 in the DO 
condition. 
Finally, because of their weak SVO, priming tends to dominate cooperative responses 
for Leon individuals in the DO.  By enhancing self-focus, Experiment 6 demonstrated that 
these priming effects were eliminated and cooperative responses were brought in line with 
the own SVO (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1981; Oibbons, 1990; Higgins, 1996b). 
Prisoner's Dilemma Oame versus Dictator Oame 
One of the most important differences between the PD~  and the DO lies in the 
(im)balance of power.  A PD~  has a balance of power: both interacting partners possess 
equal levels of control over one another's outcomes.  This means that individuals are to 
some degree dependent on the actions of their partner.  This dependence was also 
introduced in the DO-other.  In both these games each individual can guarantee himself or 
herself good outcomes.  A part of the final outcomes is, however, dependent on the 
partner's decision.  It is this feeling of "partial dependence" which may instigate the strong 
other-focus that participants had in the PD~  and in the DO-other.  Previous research using About Prisoners and Dictators  - 56 
such situations demonstrated that participants are indeed strongly inclined to form partner 
beliefs, and to use these as a basis for cooperative decision-making (e.g., De Bruin &  Van 
Lange, 1999a, 1999b; Herr, 1986; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Smeesters et a!., in press; Van 
Lange &  Kuhlman, 1994).  Most individuals do this because they attach some importance 
to reciprocity: they want to reward people that want to be cooperative but punish them if 
they fail to cooperate.  Even Reon pro-selfs were to some extent sensitive to partner beliefs 
and even use these as an ingredient in their decision processes.  However, they may do this 
for different reasons.  The neutral priming condition in the PDG already showed that Reon 
pro-selfs are fairly non-cooperative.  In the religious and business priming conditions, 
Reon pro-selfs behaved sometimes more non-cooperatively than in the neutral priming 
condition (though not always significantly so).  We believe that this pattern may be induced 
by specific feelings associated with the religious and business priming condition.  When 
Reon pro-selfs expected the other to be a mighty non-cooperative individual (in the 
business priming condition) they may have acted even more non-cooperatively as a result 
of a competitive feeling (i.e., "I do not want to be beaten by the other").  When Reon pro-
selfs expected the other to be a moral cooperative individual (in the religious priming 
condition) they may have acted more non-cooperatively as a result of an exploitation 
feeling (i.e., "a moral cooperative person is weak and therefore should be exploited", see 
Liebrand et a!., 1986; Smeesters et al., in press). 
A DG confronts interaction partners with an imbalance of power.  Two people are 
involved but only one has to make a cooperative decision.  Forming beliefs about the 
partner's behavioral intentions is disabled in the DG by the unilateral power distribution. 
People also tend to be less engaged in active impression formation (Roth, 1995). About Prisoners and Dictators  - 57 
Moreover, a dictator may sense strong feelings of independence and power, which may 
inhibit the enhancement of other-focus.  In such a situation, inequality in power rather 
triggers goals, motivations or social norms (Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Forsythe et aI.,  1994; 
Johannesson & Persson, 2000; Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000).  In the case of Heon 
individuals, the unequal power distribution triggered their SVO.  Leon individuals, 
however, were sensitive to primes, which may have activated social norms.  Religious 
primes may have made a moral cooperative norm salient instigating participants to behave 
as a "benevolent" dictator.  Business primes may have activated a mighty non-cooperative 
norm instigating individuals to behave as a "greedy" dictator.  The social exchange 
literature often states that power imbalances result in unequal distribution of outcomes 
(e.g., Markowski, Willer, & Patton, 1988; Molm, Quist, & Wisely, 1994).  However, the 
results obtained in the DG suggested that a confrontation with a powerless person does not 
always lead to strong self-interested behavior.  Sometimes, people restrain their power use 
in order to reach a rather fair distribution of outcomes (i.e., Heon pro-socials in all priming 
conditions and Leon individuals in the religious priming condition). 
Future research may examine social interactions differing in asymmetric dependence. 
In a PDG, both players possess the power to provide each other with good outcomes.  In a 
DG, only one player possesses the power to provide the other with good outcomes.  There 
may be social interactions in which both players have decision power although one player 
may have a greater control over the other player's outcomes than vice versa.  It would be 
interesting to map out how rumination about the receiving player and priming effects 
evolve with shifts in the balance of power.  . About Prisoners and Dictators  - 58 
Stereotype Priming 
Although not the main interest of our paper, our results may contribute to the current 
debate on stereotype activation.  As indicated earlier, unobtrusively activated stereotypes 
may influence both behavior and impression of others.  It has been argued that behaviors 
can be triggered without intervention of impressions of the person with whom one is 
interacting (Bargh et aI.,  1996; Bargh, 1997). Social perceptions may play an intervening 
role but a review of the literature suggests that when behavior and impressions are 
measured in the same study, it is rather the behavioral measure that shows the predicted 
difference whereas the impression measures show weak or non-existing differences (Bargh, 
1997).  This is what happened in the DG in this paper: behavior was influenced by the 
primes but not impressions (see also Bargh et aI.,  1996, Experiment 1).  Recently, Wheeler 
& Petty  (2001) have argued that in some situations biased perception may be the best 
explanation for certain patterns of behavior.  Biased perception is a mechanism whereby 
individuals exhibit behavioral changes because stereotype activation leads them to perceive 
the other differently.  Smeesters et al.  (in press) identified a PDG as such a situation in 
which a biased perception process may occur.  In replicating their research we indeed 
found that impressions also became strongly affected by primes and provided the best 
explanation for the pattern of cooperative behavior in a PDG.  We believe biased 
perception may be elicited by enhanced other-focus.  In a situation in which this other-
focus was only moderate (the DG), impressions were not affect by the primes and were not 
related to cooperative behavior.  Therefore, future research may identify and examine more 
types of situations in which individuals are strongly focused to others and to their 
environment.  We believe that in such situations, biased perception processes may likely About Prisoners and Dictators  - 59 
occur. 
Strengths, Limitations, and Issues for Future Research 
We like to close by shortly pointing out some strengths and limitations of our 
research.  First of all, our study is among of the very few in social psychology to 
investigate the influence of person and situation factors on cooperative behavior in both a 
PD~  and a DO.  This yielded a highly interesting pattern of data, suggesting that different 
processes playa role to determine cooperative decision-making.  Second, we tried to 
examine one of these cognitive processes by highlighting the role of other- and self-focus. 
Our paper is the first to touch on this issue in experimental games.  We believe that these 
concepts playa significant role in cooperative decision-making and future research may 
explore them to provide a deeper and better insight in what happens in these games. 
Our research also has some limitations.  First, SVO and consistency were assessed 
shortly before participants played their game and might have induced demand 
characteristics.  However, previous research showed that SVO, measured a substantial 
amount of time in advance, still affected behavior in the predicted ways (e.g., McClintock 
& Allison, 1989).  Second, in Experiments 1-3 we used hypothetical games: participants 
received chips and had to imagine that these represented actual money.  We tried to 
increase realism in Experiments 4-6 by giving the participants real coins.  Still, the sums 
involved were rather low.  Therefore, our games might have provoked only low 
involvement.  It could be fruitful to replicate our research with more involving games. 
Third, and as already said, the present experiments yielded information on how a PD~  and 
a DO differ from each other with respect to the role of other- and self-focus.  However, our About Prisoners and Dictators  - 60 
results do not speak to the relationship among the measures within a situation.  Our data 
may be a starting point for more process-oriented research.  Some interesting issues request 
further attention.  It could be interesting to examine what would happen if one increases 
self-focus in a PD~. Does it decrease other-focus?  Does it bring level of other- and self-
focus to the levels observed in the DO or does it increase self-focus even more?  Could we 
expect cooperative behavior in such a situation to be in line with the results we obtained in 
the DO (Experiment 3)?  It could also be interesting to observe what happens when one 
increases other-focus in a DO.  This may lead individuals to ruminate more about partner's 
character and to use the resulting impressions as an antecedent of cooperative decisions. 
For instance, religious primes may then elicit the impression of a moral other.  In such a 
situation, some individuals (e.g., pro-socials) may be willing to allocate more than in 
business priming condition, which may elicit a mighty impression of the other. 
Finally, future research may also address the following issue concerning the role of 
self-focus and the role of SVO in interdependence dilemmas.  Individuals participating in 
these dilemmas had lowered self-focus, which explained the fact that primes overrode the 
effects of self-related concepts such as SVO on the expectations and impression formation 
process.  However, although self-focus was lowered, SVO still played a role in the 
cooperative decision-making process, whereas one would expect that this role then would 
also be attenuated.  Research therefore should resolve how it is possible that under lowered 
levels of self-focus, choices towards the disambiguated interaction partner are still affected 
by SVO. About Prisoners and Dictators  - 61 
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Footnotes 
1 This measure is mostly used to assess social value orientations.  It is a computerized task 
presenting 24 choice trials, with each trial consisting of two different distributions of outcomes 
for self versus another person.  A maximal consistency score on the Ring Measure implies that 
the participant chooses all distributions of self/other outcomes consistent with his/her own social 
value orientation (Liebrand, 1984).  The consistency score on the Ring Measure decreases when 
individuals choose according another orientation on some trials. 
2 Because the Ring Measure is mostly used to measure social value orientations, an important 
instruction for participants is that they have to imagine that they are playing against an unknown 
partner who they will never meet.  This imagination is important to reduce rumination about a 
partner's behavioral intentions and to increase the value of the Ring Measure as a pure measure 
of social value orientations. 
3 At the time we conducted this experiment (and also Experiments 2 and 3) the Euro was not yet 
introduced in the countries of the European Union. 
4 In none of our experiments, we used words like cooperation, non-cooperation, pro-social or 
pro-self behavior in the instructions. 
5 We found no effects of different expectation-choice orders. 
6 We also assessed each participant's social value orientation and the consistency of it by using 
the Ring Measure of Social Values.  These factors however did not impact on the level of other-
and self-focus for the different experimental conditions (E§. < 1).  Therefore, we will not report 
anymore on these factors in Experiment 2. 
7 This counterbalancing factor did not have any effect on the results CE < 1). About Prisoners and Dictators  - 73 
8 As in Experiment 2, we also assessed each participant's social value orientation and the 
consistency of it by using the Ring Measure of Social Values.  These factors did not impact on 
the level of other- and self-focus for the different experimental conditions CE§. < 1).  Therefore, 
these factors will not be reported in Experiment 4. 
9 The counterbalancing factor did not have any effect on the results CE < 1). 
10 A post-hoc classification by using a median split matched the classification obtained with the a 
priori criteria. About Prisoners and Dictators  - 69 
Figure 1. 
Mean Cooperative Behavior as a Function of Social Value Orientation, Consistency 
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Figure 2. 
Mean Expectations of Partner's Cooperation as a Function of Social Value 
Orientation and Stereotype Primes (Experiment 1) 
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Figure 3. 
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Figure 4. 
Mean Cooperative Behavior as a Function of Social Value Orientation, Consistency, 
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Figure 5. 
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